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Abstract
This paper builds and estimates a medium scale, small open economy DSGE model augmented
with search-and-matching frictions in the labor market, and different wage setting behavior in
new and existing jobs. The model is estimated using Hungarian data between 2001-2008. We find
that: (i) the inclusion of matching frictions significantly improves the model’s empirical fit; (ii)
the extent of new hires wage rigidity is quantitatively important for key macro variables; (iii) labor
market shocks do not play an important role in inflation dynamics, but the structure of the labor
market influences the monetary transmission mechanism.
1 Introduction
This paper examines the impact of introducing search frictions and sluggish wages into an open econ-
omy DSGE model of Hungary. The model builds on the existing Hungarian DSGE model of Jakab and
Világi (2008), but adds a more detailed labor market based on the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)
search-and-matching framework, and simplifies along other dimensions. Our goal with this exercise
is threefold.
First, we are interested in how the search-and-matching rigidities modify the workings of the
model relative to the baseline where sluggish wages are a result of Calvo wage setting by monopo-
listic wage setters (Erceg, Henderson and Levin 2000; Adolfson, Laséen, Lindé and Villani, 2007). A
particular interest in our exercise is the role of wage rigidity for new hires. There is an ongoing debate
on how much new hires wages mimic wages in existing jobs.1 We contribute to this literature by sep-
arately estimating the parameter governing new hires wage rigidity, and examining the consequences
of such rigidity in a medium scale DSGE model.
Second, we explore how monetary policy and the labor market interact in a more realistic setting.2
This way we can learn about the transmission of monetary policy shocks through the labor market,
and also the impact of labor market originated shocks to the rest of the economy.
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1Pissarides (2009) and Haefke, Sonntag and van Rens (2013) find that wages of new hires are flexible. On the other hand,
Bewley (1999) and Gertler, Sala and Trigari (2008) argue that fairness and motivation lead firms to set new hires wages
relative to existing jobs. Survey evidence of the Eurosystem Wage Dynamics Network also supports the latter view (see
Galuscak et al., 2012 for cross-country evidence; and Kézdi and Kónya, 2011 for Hungary).
2See Berument, Dogan and Tansel (2009) for evidence in Turkey along similar lines.
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Finally, we contribute to the existing literature on labor DSGE models by adding search and match-
ing rigidities to a small open economy framework. We do this primarily because the Hungarian econ-
omy is highly open, so it is essential to include the export and import sectors (as well as foreign bor-
rowing and lending) to provide a realistic picture. On the other hand, we are able to explore interac-
tions between labor market rigidities and openness: the impact of shocks that originate abroad on
the labor market, and the impact of labor market disturbances on exports and imports.
The model we develop is built from standard elements, adopted to some of the special features
of the Hungarian economy. Apart from the description of the labor market, we use a somewhat sim-
plified version of Jakab and Világi (2008). The model has an intermediate good sector producing
homogenous goods, and a differentiated final good sector. The intermediate good is produced using
labor and capital. This is the sector where search and matching frictions are found. Price rigidities, on
the other hand, only apply to final good producers, who assemble differentiated products using the
domestic and imported intermediates. Thus we follow much of the literature and separate the wage
bargaining and price setting decisions for analytical convenience (see Trigari 2006, for example).
We estimate the model by Bayesian techniques on Hungarian data. Our results indicate that new
hires wage rigidity is likely to be lower then wage stickiness in existing jobs, but the parameter is very
imprecisely estimated. Impulse response analysis reveals that new hires wage flexibility has impor-
tant implications for at least some shocks and variables.
To judge the performance of our model, we evaluate it against an alternative that is a simplified
version of Jakab and Világi (2008). In particular, we replace the search-and-matching block with a
standard wage inflation Phillips curve, and include an ad-hoc specification of slow employment ad-
justment (as in Adolfson, Laséen, Lindé and Villani, 2007). We find that our baseline model is strongly
favored by the data (based on the posterior odds ratio). Also, the impulse responses generated by the
baseline model are more in line with VAR evidence on the Hungarian economy than the alternative
specification (Jakab, Várpalotai and Vonnák, 2006; Vonnák 2007).3
Overall, our exercise is similar to Christoffel, Kuester and Linzert (2006), who estimate a search-
and-matching augmented DSGE model on German data. Apart from the fact that they work with
a closed economy, there are some other important distinctions. First, we add capital as a factor of
production in addition to labor. Second, we distinguish wage rigidity for existing jobs and new hires.
Pissarides (2009) shows that the wage rigidity of new hires is the important variable for job creation,
while wages in existing jobs are not allocative in this class of models.
This is also an important difference - apart from the country coverage and the treatment of mon-
etary policy - from Albertini, Kamber and Kirker (2011), who also work with a small open economy
(New Zealand) but do not distinguish wage rigidity in new and existing jobs. Stahler and Thomas
(2012), on the other hand, do allow for different degrees of wage stickiness for new hires. Their model,
however, is designed for fiscal policy simulations in a two-country currency union, while we focus on
a small open economy with its own monetary policy. Also, Stahler and Thomas (2012) rely on calibra-
tion, while we estimate our model using Bayesian methods.
We do not consider how monetary policy should be considered in the presence of matching fric-
tions and real wage rigidity. Faia (2008) shows that with these two features, monetary policy should
target not only inflation, but also unemployment. This result comes from the fact that equilibrium
3See Benczúr and Rátfai (2014) for a comprehensive description of business cycle facts in many countries, including
Hungary.
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allocations are generally inefficient in such a framework, but the exact details of the optimal policy
depend also on the calibration. Since our goal in this paper is to examine the ability of a DSGE model
with search frictions to fit actual developments in Hungary, we leave the question of optimal mone-
tary policy for future research.
2 The model
Our model is a standard New Keynesian model based on the estimated, small open economy frame-
work of Jakab and Világi (2008) for Hungary. To that model, we add matching frictions as in Christof-
fel, Kuester and Linzert (2006); we depart from that paper by allowing different degrees of wage rigid-
ity for new and existing jobs. Relative to Jakab and Világi (2008), we simplify by dropping adaptive
learning about inflation, and by focusing on the inflation targeting period 2001-2008. This combi-
nation of an open economy DSGE framework with matching frictions and different degrees of wage
rigidity is, to the best of our knowledge, novel in the literature. Similar exercise are carried out in
Albertini, Kamber and Kirker (2011) and Stahler and Thomas (2012). The difference with respect to
the first study is the separation of new hires’ wage rigidity, while the second article is a two-country,
calibrated model focusing on fiscal policy.4
2.1 Households
There is a measure 1 of identical households in the economy; this is also the size of the labor force.
Each household has a continuum of members. The representative household maximizes intertempo-
ral utility by selecting streams of consumption, investment and foreign bond holdings. Consumption
is subject to external habits, and investment is subject to adjustment costs defined on the ratio of
current and previous investment.
Household members are either employed or unemployed; we do not model labor force partici-
pation. We use the usual assumption in the labor DSGE literature (see Merz, 1995 and Andolfatto,
1996) and assume that households provide perfect consumption insurance for their members. Thus
the marginal utility of income is the same for workers and the unemployed, and we can use the rep-
resentative consumer assumption in what follows. A fraction nh,t of the representative household h
works and hence suffers the disutility from work χt , where χt is stochastic with an expected value
of χ¯. The unemployed (1−nh,t ) draw unemployment benefits zu , which are financed by lump-sum
taxes included in the term dt .
Household h’s problem thus can be written as
maxE0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[(
Ch,t −υCt−1
)1−ϑ
1−ϑ −χtnh,t
]
4For the sake of brevity, we report only the most important aspects of the model. A detailed description is given in an
unpublished Appendix, available from the authors upon request.
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r
t
= Bh,t−1
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+nh,t
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+ (1−nh,t )zu + r kt xtKh,t−1
− a0
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1+ν
h,t Kh,t−1+dh,t
Kh,t = (1−δ)Kh,t−1+
[
1−Φ
(
e²
I
t Ih,t
Ih,t−1
)]
Ih,t ,
where Ch,t is consumption, Ct−1 is average (aggregate) consumption in the previous period, nh,t is
the employment rate, Ih,t is investment, Bh,t is foreign bonds held by the household expressed in lo-
cal currency, Rt is the gross domestic interest rate, Pt is the consumer price index, Wt is the nominal
wage rate, r kt is the (real) rental rate on capital, Kh,t−1 is the capital stock carried over from the pre-
vious period, xh,t is the endogenous capacity utilization of the capital stock, and dh,t is lump sum
net income from other sources such as dividends and government transfers. The interest rate house-
holds face is subject to a stochastic shock ²rt , while ²
i
t is an investment specific shock. We assume that
the investment adjustment cost Φ(·) is increasing and convex, with Φ(1) = Φ′(1) = 0 and Φ′′(1) > 0.
Capacity utilization is also subject to a convex cost, with ν> 0.
2.2 The wholesale sector
The wholesale sector produces a homogenous product, using capital and labor. Capital is rented from
households at the competitive rental rate r kt . The labor market is subject to search-and-matching fric-
tions. Each job is a firm-worker pair, subject to an exogenous, stochastic job destruction probability
ρt . Firms use the same technology. The production function is given by the following Cobb-Douglas
specification
yt = eat (xtkt )α ,
where yt is the amount of output produced per worker (firm), at is an exogenous productivity shock,
and kt is capital per worker.
Given the Cobb-Douglas specification and the fact that the capital market is competitive, demand
for capital is given by Pt r kt xtkt = αPw,t yt , where Pw,t is the nominal price of wholesale goods. The
equation implies that the real flow benefit of a job match for a firm is given byzt ≡ (1−α)pw,t yt ,
where pw,t = Pw,t/Pt is the relative price of the wholesale good.
2.2.1 Job flows
As is typical in the literature, new jobs are created when unemployed workers meet open job vacan-
cies. The number of matches is described by a constant returns to scale, Cobb-Douglas matching
function mt =σmvσt u1−σt , where mt is the number of new matches, vt is the number of open vacan-
cies, and ut is the number of those searching for a job. We follow the timing convention of Gertler,
Sala and Trigari (2008). Employment nt evolves according to the flow equation
nt =
(
1−ρt
)
nt−1+mt ,
where ρt is the exogenous, stochastic separation rate and we assume a match becomes productive
immediately. The number of searchers is given by ut = 1−nt−1.Workers who loose their jobs have to
wait one period to be able to search for a new one, so ut is different from the number of unemployed
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eligible for benefits, 1−nt . For future reference, we use the following (standard) notation: qt =mt/vt
is the job filling rate, st =mt/ut is the job finding rate, and θt = vt/ut is labort market tightness.
2.2.2 Average wage
We base our description of the wage setting process on Bodart, Pierrard and Sneessens (2006) and
on Konya and Krause (2009). We distinguish between wages of new hires, and wages in existing jobs.
This distinction has potentially important consequences for the job creation process, as shown by
Pissarides (2009). In particular, wage rigidity influences job creation only if new hires wages are not
fully flexible.
Both wage setting processes are described by a Calvo probability. In particular, nominal wages in
existing jobs are bargained with a probability of 1−γw , otherwise the wage is given by last period’s
nominal wage multiplied by an indexation term using current inflation. For new hires, the nominal
wage is negotiated with probability 1−δw , otherwise it is set at last period’s average wageWt−1, again
multiplied by the same indexation term. The parameter governing indexation allows us to nest nom-
inal wage rigidity (where the nominal wage stays constant), and real wage rigidity (where wages are
fully indexed to current inflation). We use the notation of W ∗t to indicate wages that are set optimally
in period t .
The evolution of the average wage depends both on the newly set wage and on those wages that
are not allowed to reset. The economy wide average nominal wage Wt evolves according to
Wt = mt
nt
[
δwWt−1Πϑwt + (1−δw )W ∗t
]
+
(
1−ρt
)
nt−1
nt
[
γwWt−1Πϑwt +
(
1−γw
)
W ∗t
]
, (1)
where Πt = Pt/Pt−1 is gross inflation. Notice that ϑw = 0 implies nominal wage rigidity, while ϑw = 1
means real wage rigidity. Our wage equation can be viewed as a more micro-founded version of the
real wage adjustment process (eq. 8) in Blanchard and Gali (2007). As we show below, the driving
process for wage inflation is the underlying flexible wage, just as in Blacnhard and Gali (2007). Differ-
ently from their model, because of search and matching frictions, the flexible wage in our framework
is not equal to marginal cost.
2.2.3 Firms
Let Vt denote the value of a vacancy and letJt denote the value of a filled job in real terms. Creating
a vacancy costs κ units, which we assume to be constant5. A vacancy is filled with probability qt and
the wage bargain takes place with probability δw . We assume the usual free entry condition to post a
vacancy, which implies that the value of vacancies is identically zero, Vt ≡ 0. Vt is thus given by
Vt =−κ+qt
[
δwJt (Wt−1)+ (1−δw )Jt
(
W ∗t
)]
. (2)
5Christoffel, Kuester and Linzert (2006) assume that vacancy costs are given by κ/λt , which makes these costs procycli-
cal. On the other hand, Yashiv (2006) and Fujita and Ramey (2007) argue for countercyclical vacancy costs, since these
amplify unemployment fluctuations. Since we include wage rigidity and a large set of shocks, and hence do not need extra
amplification, we opt for the simplest case of constant vacancy costs.
5
LetJt (W ∗t ) denote the value of a job that was renegotiated at t , and it is given by
Jt
(
W ∗t
)= zt −W ∗t
Pt
+βEt λt+1
λt
(
1−ρt+1
)[
γwJt+1
(
W ∗t
)+ (1−γw )Jt+1 (W ∗t+1)] . (3)
2.2.4 Workers
Unemployed workers receive an income zu while unemployed, which includes unemployment and
other welfare benefits (we include the value of leisure as an additional term). We use U and W (·)
to denote the value functions of unemployed workers and the value functions of workers with a job,
respectively (in real terms). The value of unemployment can be written as:
Ut = zu +βEt λt+1
λt
{
st
[
δwWt+1 (Wt )+ (1−δw )Wt+1
(
W ∗t+1
)]+ (1− st )Ut+1} . (4)
The value of a job when the wage is just negotiated is given by
Wt
(
W ∗t
)=W ∗t
Pt
− χt
λt
+βEt λt+1
λt
{(
1−ρt+1
)[
γwWt+1
(
W ∗t
)+ (1−γw )Wt+1 (W ∗t+1)]+ρt+1Ut+1} . (5)
2.2.5 Wage bargaining
When wages are negotiated, we assume that they are set as a solution to the generalized Nash bar-
gaining problem, as it is standard in the literature. Thus the wage W ∗t solves
max
W ∗t
[
Wt
(
W ∗t
)−Ut ]ηJt (W ∗t )1−η ,
where the parameter η measures the bargaining power of workers.
We can define define the "flexible real wage" or “Nash wage” as
ωt = η
(
zt +βκEt λt+1
λt
θt+1
)
+ (1−η)(zu + χt
λt
)
, (6)
which would be the wage under continuous Nash bargaining. Solving the wage bargaining problem
and using (1) yields the following log-linearized wage Phillips curve6:
pˆiw,t −ϑw pˆit =
β
[(
1− ρ¯)γw − s¯ϑδw]
ρ¯δw +
(
1− ρ¯)γw Et (pˆiw,t+1−ϑw pˆit+1)
+
[
1− ρ¯δw −
(
1− ρ¯)γw][1−βγw (1− ρ¯)]
ρδw +
(
1− ρ¯)γw (ωˆt − wˆt ) , (7)
where pˆiwt is nominal wage inflation, pˆit is the inflation rate, and wˆt = Wˆt − Pˆt is the real wage.
2.2.6 Job creation
Imposing the free entry condition for vacancy creation leads to the the job creation condition, which
can be written in log-linearized form as:
6In what follows we use variables with a hat to indicate log deviations from the steady state.
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qˆt = β
(
1− ρ¯)Et qˆt+1+ s¯
κθ¯
[
w¯ωˆt − ξ¯
(
pˆw,t + yˆt
)]−β(1− ρ¯)(Et λˆt+1− λˆt )+βρ¯Et ρˆt+1
+ δw s¯w¯
κθ¯
[
1− ρ¯δw −
(
1− ρ¯)γw][1−βγw (1− ρ¯)] [β(1− ρ¯− s¯)Et p˜iwt+1− p˜iwt ] (8)
Notice that if there is no wage rigidity for new hires, i.e. δw = 0, the job creation condition is iden-
tical to the one under continuous Nash bargaining7. With wage rigidity for new hires, however, job
creation responds not only to next period shocks, but also to the evolution of the average wage. Once
δw > 0, moreover, also the rigidity of wages in existing jobs matters for job creation. When creating
vacancies, and when wage setting for those new jobs is not completely flexible, rational firms foresee
that they may remain stuck with those wages for some time.
2.3 Final goods
The final good sector contains a continuum of monopolistically competing firms of measure 1. They
combine the homogenous wholesale good and an imported good, and produce a differentiated final
good using a CES technology, which is described by the following (real) marginal cost function:
mct =
[
αwp
1−ξ
w,t + (1−αw )p1−ξm,t
] 1
1−ξ
.
Here mct is the real marginal cost of a typical final good producer, and pm,t = P∗m,tEt/Pt is the do-
mestic relative price of the imported good. We assume that the foreign price of imports P∗m,t follows
an exogenous process, and Et is the nominal exchange rate.
Varieties are either sold domestically or exported. Consumers at home and abroad value the dif-
ferentiated final goods according to the following CES utility function:
Y j ,t =
[ˆ 1
0
Y j ,t (i )
1
1+µ j ,t di
]1+µ j ,t
,
where Y j ,t (i ) is a typical variety in sector j = d ,x (domestic end export), and µ j ,t is a time-varying
markup parameter.
Variety producers act as monopolists, and choose prices when allowed. We assume pricing to
market and local currency pricing. We use the well-known Calvo assumption, so that firms can re-
optimize prices with probability 1−γ j , j = d ,x. Those firms that do not optimize at the given date
follow a rule of thumb. Rule of thumb price setters partially increase their prices by the average rate
of past inflation, as in Smets and Wouters (2003).
After log-linearization, we arrive at the hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curve identical to that
found in Smets and Wouters (2003). Using pˆit for domestic inflation and pˆix,t for export price inflation
7This is the point made by Pissarides (2009): “In the search and matching model, the timing of wage payments during
the job’s tenure is not important for job creation. Job creation is driven by the difference between the expected productivity
and the expected cost of labor in new matches. ... as long as the firm and the worker use the Nash wage rule to split rents at
the time of job creation, the job creation conditions are unaffected by the rule used to split rents in ongoing jobs. So wages
in continuing jobs may be completely fixed, and yet, if wages in new matches satisfy the Nash wage equation, the volatility
of job creation will be unaffected by their wage stickiness.” (p. 1340)
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(denominated in foreign currency), we get the following Phillips curves for sectors j = d ,x:
pˆit = β
1+βϑEt pˆit+1+
ϑ
1+βϑpˆit−1+
(
1+βγ)(1−γ)
γ
(
1+βϑ) (mˆc t + µˆt )
pˆix,t = β
1+βϑx
Et pˆix,t+1+ ϑx
1+βϑx
pˆit−1+
(
1+βγx
)(
1−γx
)
γx
(
1+βϑx
) (mˆc t − Pˆ∗x,t − Ξˆt + µˆx,t ) ,
where Ξt = Et/Pt is the real exchange rate.
2.4 Equilibrium
The wholesale sector is composed of nt firms producing yt units of the wholesale good each. The
equilibrium condition on the domestic wholesale market is
nt yt =
ˆ 1
0
Yw,t (i ) di ≡ Yw,t .
Domestic final goods are used for consumption, investment, and government consumption. The
latter is assumed to be exogenous and unproductive, described by an autoregressive process. Gov-
ernment consumption is included both as an accounting term in the GDP identity, and also as an
exogenous demand shock that was important in Hungary in the estimation period. The government
budget constraint is balanced through lump-sum taxes that are included in the termdh,t in the house-
hold budget constraint in Section 2.1. The domestic equilibrium condition is then given as
Yd ,t =Ct + It +Gt +ad jt ,
whereCt and It are aggregate household consumption and investment, and ad jt is a term capturing
costs of vacancy creation and capacity utilization.
We assume that the country is a small open economy, which has two implications for external
links. First, a modified UIP condition holds, where the interest rate on home currency denominated
foreign bonds is given by the constant world interest rate 1/β, plus a risk premium term:
EtRt
EtEt+1
= 1
β
+ψ
[
e−(Bt−B¯)−1
]
)+e²UIPt . (9)
We follow Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) and make part of the risk-premium a function of the net
foreign asset position B . We also include an exogenous risk premium shock ²uipt .
Second, we posit an ad-hoc export demand equation, which is subject to habit formation:
Yx,t
υxYx,t−1
= (P∗x,t )−θx Y we²xt . (10)
The variable ²xt is a foreign demand shock.
Monetary policy is represented by a simple log-linearized Taylor rule:
rˆt = ζr rˆt−1+ (1−ζr ) (ζpiEt pˆit+1+ζe εˆt )+²mt , (11)
where εt is exchange rate depreciation and ²mt is a shock to monetary policy. The exchange rate is
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included because in the sample period the Hungarian currency regime was a managed float.
3 Bayesian estimation
The model is estimated using Bayesian techniques. Some parameters that correspond to steady state
averages are calibrated. We also calibrate others that are either standard in the literature, or that are
hard to identify. Since our interest is to a large extent in wage and price setting, we estimate most of
the parameters related to these aspects of the model.
The estimation of the DSGE model uses Hungarian quarterly data for twelve macroeconomic vari-
ables: real consumption, real investments, real exports, real imports, real government consumption,
real wages, employment, CPI inflation rate, nominal interest rate, import and export prices denomi-
nated in foreign currency, and the exchange rate. All real variables are HP-filtered with the standard
smoothing parameter (λ= 1600) for quarterly data. We also experimented with vacancy data, but due
to its poor quality we did not rely on it in the final estimation. The estimation sample covers the pe-
riod of 2001:Q3-2008:Q3. The start of the period is determined by the adoption of inflation targeting
in Hungary. We do not include the Great Recession period in the sample: our linearized method is
poorly equipped to handle large shocks and possible structural breaks, and on the empirical side it is
yet unclear what is the appropriate separation of trend and cyclical behavior after 2008:Q3.8
We include 12 structural shocks along with the 12 observable series. As detailed above, these are
shocks to the household interest rate, the disutility of labor, investment, intermediate production
technology, separation rate, export demand, the UIP condition, the foreign currency import price,
government consumption, monetary policy, and the domestic and export markups. The first nine
follow AR(1) processes, while the last three are white noise.
3.1 Calibration and priors
The discount rate β is calibrated to match a steady state annualized real interest rate of 4%, and the
depreciation rate is set to δ= 0.027. The capital coefficient in wholesale production α is set to equal
capital’s share in national income. The parameter αd is pinned down by the share of imports in gross
output. The shares of investment and government spending correspond to averages in the national
accounts.
We set the elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported intermediates to ξ = 0.8, to
capture the idea that substitution is relatively difficult in the short run. We take the capital utilization
parameter ν from Jakab and Világi (2008). The debt elasticity of the foreign currency interest rate
ψ is higher than in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003), but much lower than estimated values such as
in García-Cicco, Pancrazi and Uribe (2010), whose median estimate is 2.8. Our value is in the range
estimated by Magyari (2010) for Hungary. We fix the intertemporal elasticity parameter ϑ = 2 at a
standard value in the literature. Finally, as common in the literature, the steady state mark-ups are
set to µ=µx = 0.1.
< Table 1 about here >
The value of the matching function elasticity is set to σ= 0.5, which is standard in the literature;
Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) argue that this is in the reasonable range of estimates. Also in line
8See Yilmazkuday (2008) for evidence on structual breaks in transition economies.
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with the literature, for workers’ bargaining power we impose the Hosios condition and set η = σ =
0.5. The (steady state) job finding rate is taken from Hobijn and Sahin (2009), who compute these
rates for OECD countries. The quarterly value for Hungary is s¯ = 0.19. Finally, we use the average
unemployment rate between 1995-2012 to pin down the steady state unemployment rate at u¯ = 0.08.
The value of non-labor activity is difficult to reliably calibrate. It is a combination of unemploy-
ment benefits and the value of leisure. For the unemployment replacement rate zu/w¯ we use the
value reported by the OECD for Hungary9. Since we lack reliable references for the second compo-
nent ( χ¯/λ¯w¯ ), we estimate it. Note that we allow for a shock to the outside option given the large changes
in policy in the sample period.
The remaining labor market parameters and moments can be calculated from steady state con-
ditions. We use the definition of the job finding rate and the equation n¯ = 1− u¯ to get the separation
rate, which is
ρ¯ = s¯u¯
1−u .
For the chosen values for s¯ and u¯, the implied value is ρ¯ = 0.0165. This is much lower than in the US,
but comparable to European numbers and very similar to Hobijn and Sahin (2009). The steady state
level of vacancies is hard to measure, but luckily we only need to compute κθ¯ to solve the model. This
can be done using the steady state wage equation and job creation condition, along with the wage
rate.
Prior distributions for the estimated parameters are shown in the first three columns of Table 2. All
the standard deviations of the shocks are assumed to be distributed as an inverted Gamma distribu-
tion with mean and standard error of 1 percent. Prior distributions of the autoregressive parameters
are Beta with mean 0.5 and standard error of 0.15 for all shocks. Prior distributions for the rest of the
estimated parameters are shown in Table 2. Loose priors for the Calvo and indexation parameters are
assumed and they were set to be equal to a Beta with mean 0.5 and standard error of 0.15.
3.2 Estimation results
Columns 4-6 in Table 2 contain the estimation results. The price Calvo parameter γ is estimated quite
precisely, and indicates that firms change prices every fourth quarter. This is in line with other sources
of evidence for Hungary, for example firm survey data (Kézdi and Kónya, 2011). Pricing in the export
sector is more flexible.
The data is not particularly informative about the indexation parameters. The policy rule pa-
rameter posteriors are also similar to the priors, except for the exchange rate change, which is much
lower.
< Table 2 about here >
The wage Calvo parameter for existing jobs is precisely estimated, and it is significantly lower
than what is suggested in Kézdi and Kónya (2011), who find that the average survey response is about
4 quarters. Neither the wage indexation nor the new hire’s Calvo parameter are different from the
priors. Overall, while most of the estimated parameters are sensible, in many cases identification is
not very strong.
9OECD, Benefits and wages: tax-benefit indicators (2007).
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4 Evaluation
Now we turn to the evaluation of our estimated model. First, we compare our baseline results to an al-
ternative model without search and matching frictions. This exercise highlights the role of matching
frictions in the propagation of shocks. Second, we present impulse responses and shock decompo-
sitions to learn about the role of labor and non-labor shocks in generating fluctuations. In these, we
pay special attention to the role of new hires wage rigidity, where we contribute to the literature by
providing a quantitative evaluation in a medium scale DSGE model.
4.1 Model comparison
To evaluate how our model fits the data overall, it is useful to find a comparison point. For that pur-
pose, we also estimated a somewhat simplified version of Jakab and Világi (2008), which in turn build
on Smets and Wouters (2003) and Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2001). We call this the “EHL” model,
and refer to our baseline specification as the “SM” (Search and Matching) model.
To make the comparison as close as possible, we replaced the labor market block of our baseline,
but kept the rest of the model unchanged. In the EHL model, instead of the search and matching spec-
ification, wages are set by households supplying differentiated labor varieties, subject to Calvo-type
wage setting frictions. To take account of the slow adjustment of employment, an ad-hoc Phillips-
curve type equation is also specified for employment, where the driving force is the desired amount
of total hours demanded by firms.
Since the derivations are standard (see, for example, Adolfson, Laséen, Lindé and Villani, 2007),
here we simply reproduce the two main labor market equations:
pˆiw,t −ϑw pˆit =βEt
(
pˆiw,t+1−ϑw pˆit+1
)+ (1−γw )(1−βγw )
γw
(
1+σwϕ
) (ϕHˆt − λˆt − wˆt + χˆt )
nˆt − nˆt−1 =βEt (nˆt+1− nˆt )+
(
1−γn
)(
1−βγn
)
γn
(
Hˆt − nˆt
)+²nt ,
where Ht stands for total hours, σw is the elasticity of substitution between labor varieties, and ϕ is
the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply. These two equations replace 7, 8, and all conditions in
the baseline SM model linking employment, unemployment and job flows. As stated before, all other
equations of the SM and EHL models are the same.
The labor supply shock, χ is also the same in both specifications, but we replaced the separation
rate shock with an employment shock ²nt . By making employment sluggish and subject to an exoge-
nous shock, we want to give the EHL model a chance to fit the data as well as or better than the SM
model.
< Table 3 about here >
Table 3 reports some comparisons between the two estimation results. The main conclusion is
that even though the reduced form equations are very similar, the search and matching model fits the
data significantly better. Based on the log data densities reported in the table, the posterior odds ratio
strongly favors the SM model. As emphasized above, we get this result despite the fact that the two
models share the same reduced form specifications for employment and nominal wage inflation.
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The selected parameter estimates reported in Table 3 are quite similar10. The only meaningful
differences are for the consumption habit parameter, which is lower under the SM specification, and
for the wage Calvo parameter, which is higher in the SM model. For the latter, the SM wage Calvo
estimate - while still too low - is closer to what is reported in Kézdi and Kónya (2011).
Figures 1-4 plot impulse response functions for selected shocks and variables, comparing the
propagation of shocks between the two models. There are significant differences. The baseline model
produces a much lower GDP response to a monetary policy shock, in line with Jakab, Vonnák and Vár-
palotai (2006) and Vonnák (2007). The response of employment to a technology shock is more muted
in the SM model, and turns positive after two quarters; it is always negative in the EHL model. The
UIP shock has a bigger impact on inflation, and a smaller one on GDP in the SM model than in the
EHL model, in line with Vonnák (2010). The same finding emerges - even more dramatically - for the
labor supply shock. Overall, we find that while the estimated parameters are quite close, the propa-
gation of shocks in the SM model is more in line with VAR evidence for Hungary.
< Figures 1-4 about here >
These results are particularly interesting because we allow for slow employment adjustment in
the EHL model (see above). One important difference, however, remains: wages and employment are
less connected in the SM model than in the EHL model. This is so because in a frictional labor market
wages are more redistributive than allocative, due to the presence of a surplus in employment rela-
tionships. Therefore, we conjecture that the data rejects the tight relationship between (period) wages
and (short-run) employment changes in favor of a more flexible approach used in the SM model.
For similar degrees of wage rigidity, the employment - and hence GDP - response is more sluggish
in the SM model than in the EHL model. As Arsenau and Chugh (2012) explain, a very large degree of
real wage rigidity is needed in the search-and-matching model to make employment volatility sim-
ilar to that predicted by the EHL approach. Our estimation procedure, however, does not find that:
neither the extrinsic wage rigidity parameters (γw ,δw ) nor the intrinsic wage rigidity parameters (η,
zu , χ¯/λ¯) are particularly large. In Arsenau and Chugh (2012) the former are zero, while the latter fol-
low the small surplus calibration of Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), and hence deliver very rigid real
wages. Our medium scale DSGE model is able to fit data moments with a combination of shocks in-
stead, and does not require the same degree of wage rigidity (see also for Konya and Krause, 2009 for
a similar result).
4.2 The role of wage rigidity
In this section we explore the role of wage rigidity for existing and new hires in shock propagation.
This is a potentially important aspect of our model, and also connects to a large literature on the role
of wage stickiness in models with labor market frictions (Shimer, 2005; Pissarides, 2009; Haefke, C.,
M. Sonntag, T. van Rens, 2013).
Figures 5 and 6 investigate the role of new hires wage rigidity11 in shock propagation. This aspect
of the model is a novel feature of our analysis, hence we present two sets of IRFs to check whether
10This holds also for the other common parameters that we did not include in the table for brevity. The two parameters
specific to the EHL mode, σw and ϕ, are estimated, but the posteriors basically mimic the priors with means 6 and 1,
respectively.
11In the discussion that follows we sometimes use the abbreviation NHWR for brevity.
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distinguishing new hires wage rigidity is important.12 Given the very imprecise estimate of this pa-
rameter, we compare the baseline estimates to two alternative specifications: one where new hires
wages are just as rigid as wages in existing jobs (δw = γw ), and one where new hires’ wages are fully
flexible (δw = 0). The former is the assumption in Gertler, Sala and Trigari (2008); while the latter is
advocated in Pissarides (2009). We thus contribute to the growing literature on the importance of new
hires’ wage stickiness, by looking at its role in a fully fledged DSGE model.
< Figures 5-6 about here >
As the figures show, the importance of δw is very much shock and variable dependent.13 In re-
sponse to a monetary policy shock, the path of employment, and to a lesser extent GDP, is dependent
on NHWR. Inflation and the real wage, on the other hand, are unaffected. Since the estimated δw is
much closer to γw than to 0, the baseline and high rigidity impulse responses are close to each other.
Nevertheless, in case of employment, even a small increase in the flexibility of new hires’ wages have
non-negligible effects.
For the labor supply shock, inflation, employment and GDP all respond differently as δw varies.
In particular, flexible new hires wages lead to more amplification of this shock for all three variables.
Even moderate flexibility leads to noticeable changes, but the case of δw = 0 clearly stands out in
magnitude.
Overall, we conclude that at least for some shocks the flexibility of wages in new jobs is an impor-
tant determinant of shock propagation. While our mean estimated value of δw is not very far from
γw , the parameter is not identified very well in the data to leave enough ambiguity behind. New hires
wage rigidity has potentially significant quantitative implications in a medium scale DSGE model,
and hence it is an issue that needs to be investigated further.
4.3 Theoretical and historical shock decompositions
In this section we explore the relative role of different shocks to explain movements in key model
variables. We do this by presenting theoretical and historical shock decompositions for a selected set
of variables.
< Table 4 about here >
Table 4 presents the theoretical variance decomposition of a selected set of key variables in the
model, using the posterior means for the parameter values and shock innovation sizes. GDP is mostly
explained by technology shocks (νa , νi ), and to a lesser extent open economy shocks (νx , νmp ), and
the separation shock (νρ). Domestic demand and nominal shocks play essentially no role for GDP.
Monetary policy shocks matter moderately for inflation, whose fluctuations are explained mostly
by the cost push shock (µ), the investment specific shock, the UIP shock and a combination of other
shocks. The domestic interest rate shock is important for consumption, and plays a significant role
for exports and imports. Investment is basically explained by its own shock, which may indicate that
the model’s internal propagation for investment is weak.
Labor market shocks are the most important for labor market variables (employment and the real
12In response to a technology shock the differences are very small (not reported). The UIP shock IRFs are very similar to
monetary policy shocks, i.e. NHWR is important for employment only (not reported).
13Note that the real wage IRFs are very similar throughout, which should not be a surprise. Job destruction and job
creation are low in Hungary, so average wage inflation is mostly determined by the evolution and rigidity of wages in existing
jobs.
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wage). This is especially true for employment, where separation shocks account for 2/3 of the vari-
ation. This contrasts with Shimer (2005), who argue that in the US, job creation is the main cyclical
driver of (un)employment. Elsby, Hobijn and Sahin (2013) show, however, that in continental Euro-
pean economies job separation is equally important. Our result is thus closer to them than to Shimer
(2005).14
Perhaps surprisingly for a highly open economy, open economy shocks play a modest role, with
the exception of imports. The UIP shock, in particular, is significant only for inflation and exports.
This may be an artifact of our sample period: the external financing premium was low and stable in
most of this period, and became very important in the crisis years. For reasons we detailed above,
however, we do not feel confident that our detrended and linearized model can adequately capture
the crisis experience of Hungary. For a more tailored approach, see Benczúr and Kónya (2012).
Figures 7-9 show the estimated historical shock decompositions of GDP, inflation and employ-
ment. Given the large number of shocks, we grouped them into six categories: monetary, foreign
(export demand, import price and UIP), cost-push (domestic and export markup), labor (labor sup-
ply and separation), supply (technology and investment), and demand (domestic interest rate and
government spending).15
< Figures 7-9 about here >
GDP in the sample period is primarily explained by supply shocks (changes in production effi-
ciency), and in the latter part of the sample by foreign and demand shocks. The role of labor shocks
was mostly small. In contrast, all shocks contributed to inflation variation. Cost-push shocks may
be partly explained by the several changes in value-added taxes and regulated prices in Hungary dur-
ing the period. Foreign shocks are important as well: note the large negatives in the first half of the
sample (the “Chindia” effect).
Recall that in the theoretical variance decomposition, employment was mostly explained by labor
shocks. This is not the case for the historical exercise, where foreign and demand shocks are also
important. In particular, the estimation seems to capture the impact of fiscal stimulus in 2002-2004,
and fiscal austerity in 2006-2008. Both the inflation and employment charts support the view, on
the other hand, that monetary policy was lax in the second period. It is an interesting feature of the
Hungarian economy that this mostly showed up in inflation and employment, but not in GDP (Jakab,
Vonnák and Várpalotai, 2006; Vonnák, 2007).
5 Conclusions
This paper presented an estimated DSGE model of the Hungarian economy with search-and-matching
frictions. Our results show that the structure of the labor market has a significant impact on monetary
transmission. Shocks originating from the labor market, however, were not particularly important de-
terminants of variables outside the labor market in our estimation period. This does not mean that
labor market disturbances are irrelevant, but their effect may operate on a longer horizon than what
14Another difference is that we focus on employment instead of unemployment. If labor force participation (not in our
model) affects these differently, the measured role of inflows and outflows in the two-state model might also be different.
See Elsby, Hobijn and Sahin (2013b) for some new evidence on the participation margin, and Campolmi and Gnocchi (2011)
for putting participation into a DSGE model.
15We omit the role of initial conditions on the figure, it can be computed by subtracting the sum of the shock contributions
from the total.
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our model captures. Difficulties in jointly modeling search frictions and sticky prices may also con-
tribute to this finding.
Wage rigidity in existing jobs is fairly high, and it is an empirically important feature of the model.
We also find that the extent of the flexibility of new hires wages is quantitatively important for shock
propagation. This finding is, to the best of our knowledge, novel in the literature on search frictions
in medium scale DSGE models.
Foreign shocks, especially to export demand and to the exchange rate, play a moderate role in the
Hungarian economy. This, however, could be due to the selection of the sample period. Including
the crisis years after 2008 would likely change this conclusion, but our modeling framework is not
equipped to handle large shocks. This is an important avenue for future investigation.
Finally, comparing our estimates to an alternative DSGE model reveals that our structurally more
rigid labor market leads to a more realistic picture of the Hungarian economy. In particular, we find
a better overall fit, and smaller output responses to various shocks, which is more in line with VAR
evidence for Hungary.
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Tables
Table 1: Calibrated parameters
Parameters Notation Values
Discount factor β 0.99
Depreciation rate δ 0.027
Capital share in GDP α 0.34
Import share in gross output αd 0.588
Import/domestic elast. ξ 0.8
Debt elast. of int. rate ψ 0.01
Capacity util. elast. ν 5
Elast. of intertemp. subst. ϑ 2
Domestic markup µ¯ 0.1
Export markup µ¯x 0.1
Gov. cons. share in GDP g¯y 0.1035
Steady state NFA per GDP b¯y −2.4
Investment share in GDP i¯y 0.24
Unemp. replacement rate zu/w¯ 0.62
Job finding rate s¯ 0.19
Unemployment rate u¯ 0.08
Separation rate ρ¯ 0.0165
Matching function elast. σ 0.5
Workers’ bargaining power η 0.5
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Table 2: Estimated parameters
Prior Posterior
Shape Mean Std Mean Confidence interval
General parameters
υ beta 0,6 0,1 0,3983 0,2706 0,5255
υx beta 0,5 0,1 0,4438 0,315 0,5639
φ¯′′ norm 5 2 5,1599 2,6568 7,6531
γ beta 0,5 0,15 0,7232 0,6685 0,7785
ϑ beta 0,5 0,15 0,4612 0,2635 0,6844
γx beta 0,5 0,15 0,3825 0,2872 0,482
ϑx beta 0,5 0,15 0,4507 0,2285 0,6893
ζr beta 0,75 0,15 0,8183 0,7654 0,8747
ζpi norm 1,5 0,15 1,6392 1,4083 1,8503
ζe norm 1 0,5 0,1613 -0,0313 0,3432
θx beta 0,5 0,15 0,4403 0,212 0,6732
Labor parameters
γw beta 0,5 0,15 0,631 0,5475 0,7146
δw beta 0,5 0,15 0,4861 0,257 0,7074
ϑw beta 0,5 0,15 0,464 0,2288 0,7013
χ¯/λ¯
w¯ beta 0,2 0,05 0,2006 0,1169 0,2754
Autoregressive parameters
ρa beta 0,5 0,15 0,6713 0,5095 0,8307
ρχ beta 0,5 0,15 0,3006 0,1419 0,4495
ρuip beta 0,5 0,15 0,6628 0,5194 0,8083
ρx beta 0,5 0,15 0,4391 0,2609 0,6217
ρpm beta 0,5 0,15 0,8696 0,8023 0,9397
ρg beta 0,5 0,15 0,6369 0,478 0,8008
ρi beta 0,5 0,15 0,2381 0,1096 0,367
ρr beta 0,5 0,15 0,5956 0,4481 0,7575
ρρ beta 0,5 0,15 0,3577 0,1842 0,5238
Shock standard deviations
νr invg 0,01 2 0,0173 0,0083 0,0259
νm invg 0,01 2 0,0028 0,0021 0,0034
νi invg 0,01 2 0,0344 0,0267 0,0424
νa invg 0,01 2 0,0108 0,0085 0,013
νg invg 0,01 2 0,014 0,0109 0,0169
µ invg 0,01 2 0,0637 0,0411 0,0848
µx invg 0,01 2 0,0289 0,0189 0,0391
νx invg 0,01 2 0,0269 0,021 0,0326
νuip invg 0,01 2 0,0104 0,006 0,0144
νχ invg 0,01 2 0,0574 0,0336 0,0798
νpm invg 0,01 2 0,0146 0,0114 0,0178
νρ invg 0,01 2 0,1591 0,1248 0,1918
Log data density 995.49
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Table 3: Model comparison
Mean Conf. int. Mean Conf. int.
SM model EHL model
γ 0,7232 0,6685 0,7785 0,7553 0,7033 0,8061
ϑp 0,4612 0,2635 0,6844 0,5026 0,3464 0,6508
γx 0,3825 0,2872 0,482 0,4082 0,3167 0,4986
h 0,3983 0,2706 0,5255 0,4853 0,3433 0,6269
γw 0,631 0,5475 0,7146 0,4824 0,3578 0,6057
δw 0,4861 0,257 0,7074 - - -
ϑw 0,464 0,2288 0,7013 0,3819 0,1787 0,5647
Log data density 995.49 981.77
Table 4: Variance decomposition for selected variables
gdp c i n pi w yx ym
Int. premium νr 3,74 36,36 4,38 8,46 10,3 7,49 11,68 11,48
Investment νi 16,55 27,35 82,23 6,83 26,97 5,79 38,05 25,41
Technology νa 55,31 2,79 1,01 0,47 4,72 2,24 5,32 4,4
Separation νρ 4,27 0,38 0,17 59,64 0,28 0,54 0,17 0,14
Labor supply νχ 0,92 0,02 0,01 12,72 0,01 44,89 0,03 0,01
Gov. spending νg 0,05 0,1 0,03 0,01 0,05 0,03 0,13 0,11
Export demand νx 6,68 10,07 3,55 2,98 2,99 10,41 18,35 34,79
Import price νpm 9,56 14,94 6,44 4,36 3,88 18,98 5,93 20,21
UIP νuip 0,89 3,16 1,28 0,55 15,5 1,3 9,7 1,59
Dom. markup µ 0,64 1,38 0,23 1,6 23,35 6,9 4,97 0,51
Export markup µx 0,58 1,25 0,4 0,09 0,51 0,48 0,95 0,68
Mon. policy νm 0,82 2,2 0,26 2,29 11,44 0,95 4,72 0,66
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Figures
Figure 1: Shock responses in the SM and EHL models: monetary policy shock
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Figure 2: Shock responses in the SM and EHL models: technology shock
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Figure 3: Shock responses in the SM and EHL models: UIP shock
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Figure 4: Shock responses in the SM and EHL models: labor supply shock
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Figure 5: New hires’ wage rigidity - monetary policy shock
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Figure 6: New hires’ wage rigidity - labor supply shock
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Figure 7: Historical shock decomposition: GDP
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Figure 8: Historical shock decomposition: inflation
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Figure 9: Historical shock decomposition: employment
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